Animal Ethics
Animal ethics poses a major problem for modern ethical theories (utilitarianism, deontology). One tends to agree, more or less quickly, on whether animals may be tormented. But how is this to be justified? Given the philosophical construction of most theories of animal ethics, this becomes a problem in itself, since animal ethics must not be understood merely as the ethics of a morality concerned with individual animals. Animal species, biodiversity, and ecosystems are also important concerns of animal ethics. It is here that most theories of animal ethics fail. In the texts I provide here, I am continually striving to develop an animal ethics capable of doing justice to animal-moral issues in such a way that they can be interpreted as aspects of a more comprehensive ethics for the entire world. Everything in the world can be directly morally relevant, and this fact can be philosophically reconstructed and understood.
Applied Ethics (Introduction) | 2nd Edition 2026: NOMOSalber
The second edition further develops the book's approach in a fundamental way. In place of an introduction to clearly delimited fields of applied ethics, a new conception emerges: applied ethics as a topological practice of orientation.
Ethics is thereby understood not as a set of rules that derives ready-made answers from general principles, but as navigation within complex moral terrain. A functional multi-level architecture connects semantic, ontological, epistemic, practical and inclusion-theoretical questions, making visible where arguments shift their concepts, presuppositions, validity claims or addressees.
Medical, animal and environmental ethics are also reorganised in this way: not primarily according to their respective subject areas, but according to the complexity of moral addressing – ranging from direct through indirect to mediated forms of address.
The aim is not an ultimate justification “from above”, but a reflective translation between experience and argument, from which a composed fit (resultant fittingness) for the concrete case may emerge.
The second edition thus offers less a moral judge's bench than a chart table for ethical orientation: open to different paths, precise in its analysis, and closely attuned to the conflicts of practical life.
Topics in Animal Ethics
Metaethical Norms of Animal Ethics
Animal ethics asks not only what we owe animals, but also how such judgements are justified. Five metaethical norms help to examine animal-ethical theories with regard to direct moral relevance, equal worth, blind spots and their capacity for complex weighing.
“Character masks” in animal ethics
In animal ethics, character mask refers to culturally and socially shaped roles through which humans and animals perceive one another: for example, as pet, livestock, wild animal, animal lover or keeper. The term makes visible that these images are not merely individual views, but historically grown forms of thinking, feeling and acting. In this way, the concept helps us understand why the human-animal relationship is marked by contradictory perceptions and valuations. The image, in the style of Karel Appel, follows a series of pictures entitled “Hyena Men” by Pieter Hugo.
Speciesism – The Species Boundary as a Moral Boundary?
The accusation of speciesism compares the differing treatment of humans and animals with racist or sexist discrimination. But does this analogy hold? This page examines biological species boundaries, cultural human-animal boundaries, and the question of when unequal treatment becomes arbitrary.
Experience Without a Voice
Animals can suffer, experience well-being, and turn towards their environment, but they cannot translate their experience into the space of moral reasons themselves. Animal ethics must therefore advocate without appropriating, and translate without emptying experience of its content.
Beyond Outrage and Conviction
Animal ethics often begins with outrage – and quickly ends in a commitment to a particular position. Yet emotions alone do not constitute arguments, and belonging to a moral camp is no substitute for forming a judgement. This page examines how well-founded orientation can emerge from irritation, without trivialising animal suffering or allowing ethics to become a matter of professed conviction.
Moral Status – Who Counts Morally?
Moral status refers to who must be morally taken into account – but not to what extent or with what consequences. Moral relevance, equal worth, rights and practical decisiveness are distinct questions. This page breaks down the concept of status and shows its function within the terrain of animal ethics.
From Value to Obligation – The Missing Bridge
From “Animal suffering is bad” it does not follow without further ado that “Everyone must live vegan.” Between value and duty lie bridging principles such as avoidability, alternatives, reasonableness, degree of responsibility, and proportionality. At the same time, this page shows why it likewise does not follow that the use of animals is a mere private matter.
Simpsonian Animal Ethics
“Lisa the Vegetarian” (The Simpsons, 1995, S07E05) does not tell an edifying tale about love for animals, but rather a story of insight. Lisa sees in the lamb on the plate what everyone else no longer sees. What follows is the Platonic price of insight: mockery, isolation, the accusation of being an agitator. It is only on a rooftop garden above the city – in the light, outside the familiar world – that she finds affirmation. The question of the episode is not whether Lisa is right, but what it costs to be proven right. The episode is a piece of animal ethics.