---
title: "<SEMANTISCHEANALYSE />"
language: en
date: 2026-09-12
canonical: "https://andreasvieth.de/en/ppi/semantic-analysis/"
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generator: "TYPO3 LLMs.txt Extension"
---

# <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE />

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## <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE />

<SEMANTISCHEANALYSE /> poses the question that precedes every argument analysis, before it can seriously begin its work: **What does this actually mean – and does this expression point to what it purports to point to?** Every philosophical argument depends on words. Words have meanings – but the same words often have several, and different words sometimes share the same meaning, sometimes merely a similar-looking one. <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE /> renders these relations precisely visible: it reconstructs how expressions function within a text, where they slide, where they are ambiguous, and what argumentative consequences this entails.

The first fundamental distinction concerns the relation between **sense** and **reference**. The *sense* of an expression is its conceptual content – what it means, independently of what it designates. The *reference* is its object of reference – that to which it points in the world. Both can come apart: two expressions may share the same sense without sharing the same reference; and they may share the same reference without sharing the same sense. <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE /> maps both dimensions for each analysed expression – with supporting textual evidence and with attentiveness to passages where the text tacitly equates sense and reference.

The methodologically most Broad-specific instrument of this module is the distinction between **denotation** and **innotation**. *Denotation* designates the simplest semantic function: a proper name points to an individual without thereby describing any properties. *Innotation* designates what adjectives and quality predicates accomplish: they do not merely describe, they ascribe a quality to a substance – they *innotate* upon it. This distinction is no mere terminological nicety: it determines what inferential work an expression can perform. A purely denoting expression carries no properties – it can imply nothing. An innotating expression carries quality-assumptions with it that become argumentatively effective within arguments, even when they are not explicitly stated.

A second Broad-specific distinction unfolds particular analytical force: that between **Sameness of Meaning** and **Identity of Content**. Two expressions have *the same meaning* when they are truly synonymous – when one can be substituted for the other without any change to the content of the statement. Two expressions, by contrast, have only *the same content* (Identity of Content) when they are logically equivalent – when they mutually imply one another – without thereby being synonymous. This distinction is decisive for reduction programmes: whoever asserts that mental states *are* nothing but physical processes is asserting Sameness of Meaning. Whoever merely asserts that mental states and physical processes always occur together is asserting only Identity of Content. Broad has shown that phenomenalism founders precisely on this confusion: it translates physical language into sense-datum language while claiming synonymy – yet delivers only logical equivalence. <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE /> systematically examines whether a text performs this leap without disclosing it.

Beyond these intensional and extensional questions, the module analyses the **pragmatic dimension** of language use: what is not literally said in a text, yet nonetheless meant along with it? *Implicatures* are meaning-contents that are inferred from what is said, without being explicitly asserted. *Presuppositions* are prerequisites that must be true for an utterance to be meaningful at all – they are not asserted, but are tacitly taken for granted. Whoever asks, "Has King Lear stopped beating his father?" presupposes that he beat him previously. Texts that rest on implicit presuppositions which are themselves contentious conduct debates on ground that is not explicitly disclosed – and <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE /> renders this ground visible.

A final diagnostic level concerns **metaphors and semantic shifts**. Metaphorical expressions are not mere decoration; they actively structure meaning. Whoever says that a society is an "organism" has thereby already implied that it has a natural life cycle, that its parts are functionally related to one another, and that interventions are to be treated as surgical operations. None of these implications was explicitly asserted – they were carried along by the metaphorical frame. <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE /> identifies such frames, reconstructs their implicit meaning-transfers, and names which fallacies arise when the metaphor is mistaken for a literal statement.

→ <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE /> supplies the equipment for <BEGRIFFSANALYSE /> as a **strong subsequent step**: conceptual analysis works on the basis of semantically clarified expressions – without meaning-mapping, it operates in the approximate. → Its most important interface beyond conceptual analysis is **<ALETHOLOGIE />**: truth conditions are the point of contact between semantics and truth theory – what a sentence means co-determines the conditions under which it can be true. → Its most sensitive diagnostic point is the **Sameness-of-Meaning/Identity-of-Content confusion**: reduction programmes, translation claims, and definitional proposals stand or fall with this distinction – and it is passed over in philosophical texts with remarkable regularity.

#### <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE> ... </SEMANTISCHEANALYSE>

```markup
<PTL>

  <ZIELE>
    <ZIEL>Analysis of the meaning, reference, and rules governing the use of philosophical expressions: How do central terms function semantically and pragmatically?</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Identification of variants of meaning (sense/intension) and referents (extension), with textual evidence for each expression analyzed</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Distinction between denotation and innotation according to Broad: Proper names merely indicate, while adjectives describe qualities of substances</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Diagnosis of semantic pathologies: vagueness, ambiguity, presuppositions, implicatures, metaphors, and rhetorical frames</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Examination of the critical distinction: Sameness of Meaning (synonymy) vs. Identity of Content (logical equivalence without synonymy)</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Reconstruction of logical form through paraphrase and regimentation as a basis for argument analysis</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Analysis of the inferential role of expressions: Which rules of inference are associated with them—and what argumentative consequences does this have?</ZIEL>
  </ZIELE>

  <THEMA>Meaning, reference, and rules governing the use of philosophical expressions: the semantic and pragmatic structure of texts</THEMA>

  <PERSPEKTIVEN>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Intensional (sense/meaning: conceptual content of expressions)</PERSPEKTIVE>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Extensional (reference: referents and mechanisms of reference)</PERSPEKTIVE>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Pragmatic (implicatures, presuppositions, speech acts: What is said vs. what is conveyed?)</PERSPEKTIVE>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Inferential (rules of inference associated with the expression; inferential semantics)</PERSPEKTIVE>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Pathological (vagueness, ambiguity, metaphors, semantic shifts)</PERSPEKTIVE>
  </PERSPEKTIVEN>

  <METHODEN>
    <METHODE>Mapping variants of meaning: identification of the different senses of a term in the text, in each case with textual evidence and contextual information</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Reference analysis / denotation test: examination of what terms indicate—and whether adjectives are used denotatively (merely designating) or innotatively (describing qualities of substances)</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Use/mention test: distinction between speaking about words (mention) and speaking with words (use)</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Paraphrase and regimentation: reformulation into a clearer logical form (quantification, modality, negation) in order to make the semantic structure visible as a basis for argument analysis</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Inferential role analysis: Which rules of inference are associated with the expression? Its role in justification and refutation</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Context-parameter analysis: standards, comparison classes, speaker intention, domain; examination of contextualist dependence of meaning</METHODE>
  </METHODEN>

  <KERNFRAGEN>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Sinn/Bedeutung">Which variant of meaning does the expression X have in the text—and which polysemous variants must be distinguished?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Referenz">To what does X refer—and under what conditions? Names vs. descriptions; direct vs. descriptive reference?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Denotation/Innotation">Is the expression merely denoting (a proper name)—or does it also innotate qualities of substances? (Distinction according to Broad)</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Semantik/Pragmatik">What is the relationship between semantics and pragmatics? What is said literally—and what is additionally conveyed through implicatures, presuppositions, or speech acts?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Definitionen">What role do definitions and explications play—stipulative or reconstructive? Are definitions stabilized in use?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="LogischeForm">What is the logical form of the relevant expression—quantification, modality, negation? What does regimentation reveal?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="SemanischeVerschiebungen">Are there semantic shifts due to metaphors, analogies, or rhetorical frames—and what risk of fallacies arises from them?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="SamenessOfMeaning">Is this a case of Sameness of Meaning (genuine synonymy)—or merely Identity of Content (logical equivalence without synonymy)? This is critical in attempts at reduction and translation</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Wahrheitsmodell">How are truth and reference semantically modeled in the text—through truth conditions or through rules of use? Interface with alethology?</KERNFRAGE>
  </KERNFRAGEN>

  <KATEGORIEN>
    <KATEGORIE>Sense / meaning / intension (conceptual content)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Reference / extension (referents in the world)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Denotation vs. innotation (Broad: proper names vs. adjectives describing qualities)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Sameness of Meaning vs. Identity of Content (synonymy vs. logical equivalence)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Vagueness (indeterminacy, borderline cases, sorites)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Ambiguity (polysemy, homonymy, shifts in sense)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Presupposition (what is assumed and must be true for an utterance to be meaningful)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Implicature (what is conveyed without being said literally)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Metaphor / analogy (figurative use and its argumentative role)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Truth conditions (semantics as the conditions under which sentences are true)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Inferential semantics (meaning through rules of inference and justificatory roles)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Use / mention (speaking about words vs. speaking with words)</KATEGORIE>
  </KATEGORIEN>

  <REGELN>
    <REGEL1>Systematically identify all passages in which semantic questions arise—explicitly through attempted definitions and statements of meaning, or implicitly through polysemy, metaphor, and shifts in meaning over the course of the text</REGEL1>
    <REGEL2>Map variants of meaning with textual evidence: Is the same expression used in different senses in different passages? Mark shifts in meaning that occur without explicit notice as a semantic risk</REGEL2>
    <REGEL3>Examine according to Broad: Is the expression denoting (a proper name that merely indicates an individual) or innotating (an adjective that describes qualities of substances)? This distinction determines the expression’s inferential scope</REGEL3>
    <REGEL4>Examine Sameness of Meaning vs. Identity of Content: Logical equivalence between two expressions does not mean that they have the same meaning. Attempts at reduction and translation (for example, in phenomenalism) often fail precisely because of this conflation</REGEL4>
    <REGEL5>Analyze metaphors and semantic shifts: What argumentative work does a metaphorical expression perform—and what fallacies arise if the metaphor is taken literally?</REGEL5>
    <REGEL6>Map interfaces: Where does semantic analysis intersect with conceptual analysis (inferential roles), alethology (truth conditions), and pragmatics (presuppositions, implicatures)?</REGEL6>
  </REGELN>

  <ANALYSEKRITERIEN>
    <KRITERIUM>Complete mapping of variants of meaning, with textual evidence for each expression analyzed</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Correct distinction between denotation and innotation according to Broad for each relevant expression</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Precise separation of Sameness of Meaning and Identity of Content—especially in claims of reduction and equivalence</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Identification of presuppositions, implicatures, and pragmatic shifts, with textual evidence</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Paraphrase and regimentation as an explicit analytical step: making logical form visible before evaluating arguments</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Fidelity to the text and internal consistency; shifts in meaning over the course of the text as a finding in their own right</KRITERIUM>
  </ANALYSEKRITERIEN>

  <SEMANTISCHEANALYSE
    ziel="Analyse von Bedeutung, Referenz und Gebrauchsregeln philosophischer Ausdrücke: semantische Struktur, Pathologien und inferentielle Rollen"
    begriff="[Zielausdruck eintragen]"
    methode="zergliedern|sinnunterscheiden|definitionsanalyse|mehrdeutigkeit|referenzanalyse"
    zielModus="definitionsfindung|klarheitssteigerung|ambiguitaetsauflosung|gebrauchsrekonstruktion"
    kernbegriffe="Bedeutung, Sinn, Referenz, Definition, mehrdeutig, vage, metaphorisch, Implikatur, Präsupposition, Innotation, Wahrheitsbedingung"
    typischeVerben="bedeuten, heißen, referieren, implizieren, präzisieren, paraphrasieren, unterscheiden, definieren"
    fragetypen="Was meint der Text mit …? Worauf bezieht sich …? Unterscheidung wörtlich/übertragen; Bedeutungswandel im Textverlauf"
    analyseFokus="intensional|extensional|pragmatisch|inferentiell|pathologisch"
    schnittstellen="Begriffsanalyse|Alethologie|GeltungstheoretischeAnalyse"
  >
    <!-- Analytical steps:
    1. Identify all passages involving semantic questions: attempted definitions, polysemy, metaphors, shifts in meaning
    2. Map variants of meaning (mapping variants of meaning): sense/intension with textual evidence
    3. Examine reference (extension): What does the expression indicate? Names vs. descriptions?
    4. Examine Broad: denoting (proper name) vs. innotating (adjective/description of qualities)?
    5. Use/mention test: Is the expression being spoken about, or is it being used to speak?
    6. Paraphrase and regimentation: make logical form (quantification, modality, negation) explicit
    7. Examine Sameness of Meaning vs. Identity of Content—especially in claims of reduction
    8. Analyze metaphors and semantic shifts: argumentative function and risk of fallacy
    9. Examine presuppositions and implicatures: What must be true for the utterance to be meaningful?
    10. Inferential role analysis: Which rules of inference are associated with the expression?
    11. Map interfaces: conceptual analysis, alethology, theory of validity
    -->
  </SEMANTISCHEANALYSE>

  <METAPRUEFUNGEN>
    <PRUEFEKOHAERENZ />
    <PRUEFETEXTBEZUG />
    <FINDEARGUMENTALTERNATIVE />
    <PRUEFEANNAHMEN />
    <ERLAEUTERERELEVANZ />
  </METAPRUEFUNGEN>

  <TEXTERSTELLUNG>
    <ANTWORESTRIKTANALYSEORIENTIERT />
  </TEXTERSTELLUNG>

</PTL>
```

 *<SEMANTISCHEANALYSE> ... </SEMANTISCHEANALYSE>*