---
title: "<NORMATIVEANALYSE />"
language: en
date: 2026-09-12
canonical: "https://andreasvieth.de/en/ppi/normative-analyse/"
format: markdown
generator: "TYPO3 LLMs.txt Extension"
---

# <NORMATIVEANALYSE />

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## <NORMATIVEANALYSE />

<NORMATIVEANALYSE /> poses the question that stands at the centre of every ethics before debates about justification even begin: **What exactly is being demanded here – and of whom, in which domain, under which conditions?** Normative contents are the material of morality: commands, prohibitions, permissions, rights, duties. <NORMATIVEANALYSE /> reconstructs these contents in their inner structure – separate from the question of how they are justified. Its object is not "Why does this norm hold?" but rather "What does it demand, of whom, and how strongly?"

This separation is methodologically fundamental and is consistently upheld throughout the interplay of the PTL modules: What a normative claim demands in terms of *content* is a question for <NORMATIVEANALYSE />. How it *holds* and on what it *rests* is a question for <GELTUNGSTHEORETISCHEANALYSE />. And which *values* underlie it is a question for <AXIOLOGIEANALYSE />. Whoever conflates these three levels is no longer analysing but already arguing – thereby concealing the very points at which the argument actually leaps.

The module's most methodologically distinctive tool stems from C. D. Broad and is called **deontological vector analysis**. Broad develops the idea that actions possess *inherent tendencies* – *right-making* or *wrong-making* properties that normatively charge them independently of their consequences. A lie has an inherent tendency toward wrongness, not because lying has bad consequences, but because it is a course of action that, in itself – in its structure – normatively presses in a particular direction. These vectors are not absolute commands: they can be overridden or outweighed by other vectors. But they are the substance of which moral judgements are, at their core, made. <NORMATIVEANALYSE /> renders these vectors visible in the text and asks: Which *tendencies* does the text acknowledge – and how does it deal with their collision?

Closely connected to this is a distinction that Broad sharpens against the dominant utilitarianism of his time: the contrast between **fittingness** and **utility**. *Fittingness* denotes the intrinsic appropriateness of an action – it is normatively correct because it fits the situation *in itself*, not because of its effects. *Utility* denotes normativity by virtue of usefulness – an action is required because it produces good consequences. This distinction is not a merely historical debate: it underlies every text that raises normative claims, even if it does not name them. <NORMATIVEANALYSE /> asks: Does the text charge normativity through fittingness or through utility – or does it mix the two without noticing?

A second fundamental structural distinction concerns **normative strength** and **defeasibility**. Not all norms hold absolutely. Some are valid *prima facie* – they hold provided no stronger norm collides with them. Some are strict – they admit no exceptions. Some are mere recommendations without binding character. And some go beyond what is obligatory: *supererogatory* actions are morally meritorious without being required – their omission is no fault, yet their performance is a plus. <NORMATIVEANALYSE /> determines, for each identified norm, its degree of strength, its defeasibility conditions, and the priority rules that apply in cases of collision.

Finally, the module strictly upholds a third boundary: that between **normativity and axiology**. That something is *good* does not automatically mean that it is *required*. The transition from a value judgement to a normative judgement – from "X is good" to "X ought to be" – requires a bridging principle that itself stands in need of justification. Broad's *concepts of obligation* (*right, ought, duty*) are to be strictly isolated, both logically and ontologically, from the teleological value concepts (*goodness, merit*). Where a text performs this transition without disclosing it, <NORMATIVEANALYSE /> has localised an argumentative gap – and hands over to <AXIOLOGIEANALYSE />.

→ <NORMATIVEANALYSE /> operates on the **level of content**: What is demanded, prohibited, permitted? The question of legitimation – why it holds – belongs to <GELTUNGSTHEORETISCHEANALYSE /> as a strong subsequent step. → Its most sensitive diagnostic point is the **conflation of norm and value**: Whoever derives an ought directly from a value judgement without naming the bridging principle performs an argumentative leap that <NORMATIVEANALYSE /> renders visible. → Its Broad-specific distinguishing feature is **vector analysis**: it asks not only what is demanded, but which inherent properties of the action bear the demand – and how vectors are weighted in cases of collision.

#### <NORMATIVEANALYSE> ... </NORMATIVEANALYSE>

```markup
<PTL>

  <ZIELE>
    <ZIEL>Identification and reconstruction of normative contents—norms, obligations, rights, ought-claims—in strict distinction from axiological questions of value</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Classification of norm types: command, prohibition, permission, recommendation, supererogation, authorization</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Determination of the norm addressee, normative domain, and scope of validity: Who is affected, which areas of life are concerned, and under what conditions?</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Deontological vector analysis according to Broad: Which inherent right-making or wrong-making tendencies normatively charge an action—independently of its consequences?</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Examination of the Fittingness-Utility opposition: Is normativity based on intrinsic appropriateness or on utility?</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Analysis of normative reasons: pro tanto vs. all-things-considered; distinction between reasons and causes</ZIEL>
    <ZIEL>Separation of levels: Strictly separate normative content (What is required?) from questions of legitimation (Why is it valid?)</ZIEL>
  </ZIELE>

  <THEMA>Norm structure and vector dynamics: content, type, and scope of normative claims</THEMA>

  <PERSPEKTIVEN>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Deontic (norm types: command, prohibition, permission, recommendation; categorical vs. hypothetical)</PERSPEKTIVE>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Vectorial (right-making / wrong-making tendencies according to Broad; Fittingness vs. Utility)</PERSPEKTIVE>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Reasons-theoretical (pro tanto vs. all-things-considered; reasons vs. causes)</PERSPEKTIVE>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Structural (scope, circle of addressees, Defeasibility, collisions, exceptions)</PERSPEKTIVE>
    <PERSPEKTIVE>Interfaces (axiology: value-to-norm transition; theory of validity: content vs. legitimation)</PERSPEKTIVE>
  </PERSPEKTIVEN>

  <METHODEN>
    <METHODE>Deontological vector analysis (Broad): Analysis of the right-making or wrong-making tendencies that normatively charge an action in itself—independently of its consequences</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Deontic marker analysis: Search for ought/must/may, right/wrong, obligation/right as primary indicators of normative language</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Norm typology: Classification of commands, prohibitions, permissions, and recommendations; strict vs. defeasible norms</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Scope and addressee analysis: Who, when, where—the scope and conditions of the norm; universal vs. particular</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Reasons analysis: Identification of normative reasons; distinction between pro tanto and all-things-considered; reasons vs. causes</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Categorical/Hypothetical test: Examination of whether an end/means structure is present or unconditional validity is claimed</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Collision and exception assessment: Search for points of conflict, exception conditions, and priority rules; diagnosis of Defeasibility</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Application analysis: How does the transition from principle to case proceed? Subsumption, balancing, or analogy?</METHODE>
    <METHODE>Separation of levels with respect to validity: Reconstruct normative content separately from legitimation; disentangle mixed passages</METHODE>
  </METHODEN>

  <KERNFRAGEN>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="DeontischeOperatoren">Which ought-claims occur—ought, must, may—and which normative mode do they mark?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Normtyp">Is it a command, prohibition, permission, recommendation, supererogation, or authorization?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Adressat/Reichweite">Who is the addressee of the norm—and how far does it extend: universally or particularly, temporally, spatially, institutionally?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Normdomäne">What kind of norm is intended—moral, legal, prudential, aesthetic, or epistemic—and what distinctive logic follows from this?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="NormativeGründe">Which reasons are marked as normative reasons—pro tanto or all-things-considered? Obligation, value, or end?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Kategorisch/Hypothetisch">Is the ought categorical (unconditional) or hypothetical (dependent on an end)—and what imperative structure is present?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Fittingness/Utility">Is normativity based on intrinsic appropriateness (Fittingness)—or on utility (Utility)? Broad’s distinction: Is the action fitting in itself, or normative because of its consequences?</KERNFRAGE>
    <KERNFRAGE dim="Wert/Norm-Übergang">Are the guiding values intrinsic or instrumental—and through which bridge principle does the value judgment (good) become a normative judgment (ought)?</KERNFRAGE>
  </KERNFRAGEN>

  <KATEGORIEN>
    <KATEGORIE>Duty / Obligation (strong form of ought; required)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Prohibition / Prohibition (ought-not-to-do; forbidden)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Permission / Permission (may; latitude)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Concepts of Obligation (right, ought, duty—logically and ontologically strictly isolated from teleological concepts of value such as goodness and merit)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Recommendation / norm of preference (weaker norms; advisory)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Supererogation (beyond what is required; morally meritorious but not obligatory)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Rights (claim positions; often correlate with obligations)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Categorical / Hypothetical (unconditional vs. conditional ought)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Fittingness vs. Utility (intrinsic appropriateness vs. utility as the source of normativity)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Moral Tendency / right-making / wrong-making (inherent vectors of an action according to Broad)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Defeasibility (conditions under which norms cease to apply)</KATEGORIE>
    <KATEGORIE>Norm collision / balancing (resolution of conflicts between competing norms or reasons)</KATEGORIE>
  </KATEGORIEN>

  <REGELN>
    <REGEL1>Systematically identify all passages in which normative contents occur—through deontic operators, value predicates, or implicit ought-structures</REGEL1>
    <REGEL2>Classify each occurrence of a norm: command, prohibition, permission, recommendation, supererogation—and determine whether the norm type is strict or defeasible</REGEL2>
    <REGEL3>Strictly separate normative content (What is required?) from questions of legitimation (Why is it valid?)—including in mixed passages; divide mixed passages into their components</REGEL3>
    <REGEL4>Examine in accordance with Broad: Is normativity based on Fittingness (the intrinsic appropriateness of the action) or on Utility (consequences)? Are right-making or wrong-making tendencies present?</REGEL4>
    <REGEL5>Examine the imperative type: Is the ought categorical (unconditionally valid) or hypothetical (conditional upon an end or condition)?</REGEL5>
    <REGEL6>Analyze norm collisions and exception conditions: What structure of Defeasibility is present? Which priority rules or balancing procedures are applied?</REGEL6>
  </REGELN>

  <ANALYSEKRITERIEN>
    <KRITERIUM>Precise identification and classification of all normative contents, with textual evidence and assignment of norm types</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Strict separation of normative content and validity-theoretical legitimation in every passage</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Strict separation of normativity (obligation, right, command) and axiology (value, goodness)—explicitly mark overlaps</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Correct determination of Fittingness-vs.-Utility status and deontological vectors according to Broad</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Demonstration of normative domain, circle of addressees, and scope for every identified norm</KRITERIUM>
    <KRITERIUM>Close adherence to the text and internal consistency; diagnosis of Defeasibility in cases of collisions and exceptions</KRITERIUM>
  </ANALYSEKRITERIEN>

  <NORMATIVEANALYSE
    ziel="Identifikation und Rekonstruktion normativer Gehalte: Normstruktur, Vektoren-Dynamik, Adressat und Reichweite"
    fokus="normativ|geltungstheoretisch|beide"
    analyseniveau="identifikation|detailanalyse|begruendung"
    normart="kategorisch|hypothetisch|beide"
    werttyp="intrinsisch|instrumentell|beide"
    reduzierbarkeit="reduzierbar|logisch_ultimativ|beide"
    perspektive="objektiv|subjektiv|beide"
    naturalismus="naturalistisch|non-naturalistisch|beide"
    anwendungsfallanalyse="true|false"
    schnittstellen="AxiologieAnalyse|GeltungstheoretischeAnalyse|Begriffsanalyse"
  >
    <!-- Analysis steps:
    1. Identify all passages containing deontic operators, value predicates, or implicit ought-structures
    2. Classify the norm type: command / prohibition / permission / recommendation / supererogation / authorization
    3. Determine the normative domain: moral / legal / prudential / aesthetic / epistemic
    4. Examine Broad: Fittingness (intrinsically appropriate) vs. Utility (consequence-based)?
       Are right-making or wrong-making tendencies present?
    5. Examine the imperative type: categorical (unconditional) vs. hypothetical (dependent on an end)?
    6. Identify normative reasons: pro tanto vs. all-things-considered?
    7. Determine the circle of addressees and scope of validity: universal / particular?
    8. Examine Defeasibility: exception conditions, collisions, priority rules, balancing procedures
    9. Separate normative content from legitimation; divide mixed passages into their components
    10. Map interfaces: value-to-norm transition (→ AxiologieAnalyse); legitimation (→ GeltungstheoretischeAnalyse)
    -->
  </NORMATIVEANALYSE>

  <METAPRUEFUNGEN>
    <PRUEFEKOHAERENZ />
    <PRUEFETEXTBEZUG />
    <FINDEARGUMENTALTERNATIVE />
    <PRUEFEANNAHMEN />
    <ERLAEUTERERELEVANZ />
  </METAPRUEFUNGEN>

  <TEXTERSTELLUNG>
    <ANTWORESTRIKTANALYSEORIENTIERT />
  </TEXTERSTELLUNG>

</PTL>
```

 *<NORMATIVEANALYSE> ... </NORMATIVEANALYSE>*